The Hindu
September 4, 2002
Is an attack on Iraq legal?
By V. S. Mani
The U.N. Security Council alone is competent to authorize military action under
its direct control against a recalcitrant state.
THE STAGE is being set for the United States to take unilateral military action
against Saddam Hussein. The `hawks' in the U.S. administration are in a frenzy
even as the first anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks draws near.
The Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, has said that fleeing Al-Qaeda
terrorists from Afghanistan have found refuge in Iraq. He ridiculed the
suggestion that Mr. Hussein was possibly unaware of this. He is reported to have
said: "In a vicious, repressive dictatorship that exercises near-total
control of its population, it is very hard to imagine that the Government is not
aware of what is taking place in the country." (He would not, of course,
extend the same logic to other, `friendly' military dictatorships!). Addressing
a National Convention of the American Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 26, the
U.S. Vice-President, Dick Cheney, conceded that "Intelligence is an
uncertain business, even in the best of circumstances". Yet, he was
convinced that, "simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now
has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use
against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt
that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations
with his neighbours ó confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has
today, and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth".
"The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action," he
thundered to the enthusiastic applause of the war veterans. The legal arguments
in support of a possible pre-emptive attack on Iraq appear to be three-fold, one
based on the U.N. Security Council resolutions, the second, the right of self-defence,
and the third, a duty to prevent and punish acts of international terrorism.
So far the Security Council has, acting both in camera and in open sittings,
adopted wide-ranging resolutions pursuant to its broad powers of enforcement
action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Resolution 678 of November 30,
1990, inter alia, authorized "member-states cooperating with the Government
of Kuwait," i.e., the 28-member multinational group led by the U.S.,
"to use all necessary means to implement Security Council Resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international
peace and security in the area". It was well known that "necessary
means" included the use of military force by the U.S.-led multinational
group, which the Cuban representative promptly characterized as "a virtual
declaration of war". Can this resolution be the basis for further military
action against Iraq? Obviously not. Its purpose was to vacate the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait and resolve related issues. While one may have serious legal
reservations about the Security Council's constitutional power to delegate
unconditionally its plenary powers (to employ armed forces on behalf of the organization)
to a selected group of states to be exercised without any accountability to the
Council, this authorization expired when the objectives of vacating the
aggression were achieved by April 1991. Hence, the all-pervasive Council
resolution 687 of April 5, 1991, which laid down the framework for shearing Iraq
of all potential for weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological
weapons, and delivery systems, under international supervision. Violations, if
any, of the obligations imposed on Iraq by this and other subsequent resolutions
would call for remedial action by the Council acting under Chapter VII. It would
not justify unilateral action by the U.S. outside the framework of the Charter.
No one has authorized the U.S. and its allies to sit in judgment over such
violations and `enforce' the obligations imposed by the Council, on its behalf.
A second basis for possible unilateral action by the U.S. against Iraq would be
self-defense. But where is the justification for such action? Military action in
self-defense must respond to an armed attack. Two arguments are raised here in
support of the U.S. One, Iraq has been shooting at U.S. and British aircraft
over the two "no-fly zones" over Iraq and hence the several
retaliatory air strikes by the U.S. and U.K. over the years since March 1991
when these zones were established. The legal basis of these "no-fly
zones" is claimed to be the Council resolution 688 of April 5, 1991. This
resolution, adopted not under Chapter VII, condemned the repression by the Iraqi
Government of its Kurdish population, which amounted to a threat to
international peace and security. In fact, the establishment of these zones was
a unilateral act by U.S.-U.K.-France, a clear violation of Iraqi sovereignty,
and no authority flowed from the Council resolution. In other words, the
establishment of the no-fly zones was illegal per se and no right of self-defense
arises in defense of an originally illegal situation.
A second argument on the basis of self-defense is more remarkable. The Dick
Cheney argument runs thus: Saddam Hussein's `conduct or history' does not give
any scope for hope. The U.S. should not repeat the mistake it made during World
War II in ignoring the magnitude of the danger it faced until it received,
unexpectedly, a devastating blow at Pearl Harbour. "What we must not do in
the face of a mortal threat is give in to wishful thinking or willful
blindness." So, don't wait until the `monster' hits you with nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Thus, action now and a regime
change in Iraq are in order. This argument is legally flawed in two respects.
First, the use of force in self-defense is justified only in case of an armed
attack, not in case of a perceived security threat. Second, effecting a regime
change is not the function of an outside power; it is inane in the face of the
Iraqis' right to self-determination. Forcible intervention to effect a regime
change was roundly condemned by the International Court of Justice in the
Nicaragua case. (1986, paragraphs 255, 258).
Finally, does the obligation of every state to "prevent and punish"
acts of international terrorism imply a right to resort to military force
unilaterally? The obligations in respect of "preventing and punishing"
criminal acts of terrorism are obligations to be implemented within the
territorial jurisdiction of a state. By no stretch of imagination can a duty to
"prevent" imply a duty to "take unilateral military action"
against another state under the facade of enforcement of international
obligations.
At any rate, since the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1373 on
September 28, 2001, the Council alone is competent to authorize military action
under its direct control against a recalcitrant state. Nor can the U.S. claim an
extended right of self-defense based on the September 11 attacks on the specious
argument that many Al-Qaeda operatives, driven out of Afghanistan, have now
found safe havens in Iraq illustrating Mr. Hussein's complicity in promoting
international terrorism.
It is understandable that arrogance of power usually leads to a preference for
unilateralism in use of military force. In any unilateral action of this type,
the biggest casualty is the truth. It is therefore advisable to seek the
interposition of the available international organisation in such matters.
Organisational interposition has a dual advantage. One, a claim of gross
violations of international obligations could be subject to multilateral
appraisal. Two, responses to them would have better chances of international
legitimacy and accountability.
(The writer teaches International Law at the School of International Studies,
JNU.)